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Abstract In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper
name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional
contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so
associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional
phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something
could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so).
Used as an adjunct, the descriptive content of a proper name expresses the addi-
tional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and
constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should
be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified
predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a
proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coref-
erential names in simple sentences.
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1 Introduction
In 2004 in Austria a scandal erupted around the holiday taken in the Tyrol region by
the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko. ‘Europe’s last dictator’ bypassed
the EU sanctions which prohibited the entry of the Belarusian president to the
European Union. But how was he able to do so despite being blacklisted? It
transpired that Lukashenko also chaired the Belarusian Olympic Committee and
some Austrian bankers managed to circumvent the ban on his entry to the EU by
inviting him as the chairman of the Belarusian Olympic Committee. In the context
of this unbelievable (but true) story, consider the two sentences below:
(1) The President of Belarus is blacklisted
(2) The chairman of the Belarusian Olympic Committee is not blacklisted
As we know, the President of Belarus and the chairman of the BOC is the same
person. Intuitively both sentences could be true at the same time but, according to
the standard definition of the satisfaction of formulas with a definite description in a
modal logic given for example by Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998: 232, 254), these
sentences are contradictory. Let ‘B’ stand for ‘to be blacklisted’, ‘ix.P(x)’ stand for
‘the present President of Belarus’ and ‘ix.C(x)’ stand for ‘the present chairman of
the Belarusian Olympic Committee’. According to standard definition,
(1) Mgwt ky:B yð Þð Þ ix:P xð Þð Þiff
Mgð
d
y ÞwtB yð Þ;where d ¼ Ig
w;th i ix:P xð Þð Þ:
(2) Mgwt ky: B yð Þð Þ ix:C xð Þð Þ iff
Mgð
d
y Þwt B yð Þ; where d ¼ Ig
w;th i ix:C xð Þð Þ iff
Mgð
d
y Þwt2B yð Þ; where d ¼ Ig
w;th i ix:C xð Þð Þ:
As we know from the story above, I
g
w;th i ix:P xð Þð Þ ¼ Igw;th i ix:C xð Þð Þ, so sentences (1)
and (2) are contradictory because one and the same person could not be blacklisted
and not blacklisted at the same time.1 Sentences such as (1) and (2) constitute an
example of non-substitutivity between two coreferential expressions in simple
sentences. Link (1983), Landman (1989) and Szabo´ (2003) drew attention to the fact
that the phenomenon of lacking substitutivity is widespread and, apart from
descriptions, concerns coreferential groups terms (The Committee Puzzle), plural
terms (‘The judges/the hangmen are on strike’, Landman 1989: 724) and natural
kinds terms (‘Water is often dirty, but H2O is never dirty’, Szabo´ 2003: 387).
Recently Saul (1997, 2007) noted that a substitution failure also occurs in simple
sentences when a change from one coreferential proper name to another affects the
truth-value of a sentence in an extensional context. Consider:
(3) Cassius Clay was never beaten whereas Muhammad Ali lost five times.
1 A scope of a negation is without importance here because it does not affect truth-conditions—assuming
that the descriptions designate, formula (2) and its variant with a negation in wide scope have exactly the
same truth-conditions.
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Intuitively, (3) could be true: Muhammad Ali was never beaten when he fought as
Cassius Clay and he lost five times when he fought as Muhammad Ali. The
divergences between intuitions and formal truth conditions suggest that the role of
descriptive content associated with proper names (and other terms) could not only
be reference determining but this content could also be truth-conditionally relevant
in some other way and be an additional contribution of a proper name into truth-
conditions. This hypothesis explains why intuitive truth-conditions for sentences
with proper names (and other terms) could differ from the truth-conditions of these
sentences in a standard model. In this paper I will concern myself with the
descriptive content of proper names and develop a hypothesis that it could behave as
a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and, as such, could modify a predicate (that is,
could express truth-conditionally relevant circumstances of action named by the
predicate). The main thesis of this paper is that identifying descriptions the so-and-
so associated by speakers with a proper name could be used as qualifying
prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so the sentences containing a proper name NN is
doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which
means as so-and-so).
The paper is structured in the following manner. In the next two sections I
explain the notion of as-phrases modification and list its semantic properties. In
Sect. 4 I propose a formal representation of as-phrases modification and, in Sect. 5,
I briefly outline a way in which the puzzle of substitution failure of proper names in
simple sentences could be solved with the help of this formalism. Section 6 contains
concluding remarks and finally in Sect. 7 I present the formal machinery for
predicate modifiers and prove some statements.
2 Qualifying prepositional as-phrases
Let us look again at (1), (2) and (3) sentences. It is very natural to paraphrase all of
them using as-phrases: Lukashenko had a ban on visiting the EU as the President of
Belarus but had no ban on visiting the EU as the chairman of BOC. Similarly the
greatest boxer was never beaten when he fought as Cassius Clay and he lost five
times when he fought as Muhammad Ali.2 All the paraphrases contain the as
preposition which, as with all prepositions, syntactically should be completed by a
NP-phrase (Carnie 2006: 69). Such a NP-phrase could be very complex and contain
explicitly expressed predicates or it could be represented by the anaphoric pronoun
such (as such). The presence of the such pronoun in a paraphrase is evidence of
2 Similarly all examples with terms other than proper names and descriptions could also be paraphrased
with as-phrases: ‘The judges are on strike as judges’/‘The hangmen, as hangmen, are not on strike’
(Landman 1989: 729–730); ‘Water is often dirty but H2O as such is never dirty’, ‘The statue is made of
copper but the copper as such isn’t made of anything’ (Szabo´ 2003: 388), ‘Lex fears Superman as such’,
‘Lex fears Clark, not as such but as Superman’ (Forbes 2006: 158, 159).
The descriptive content of names as predicate modifiers 2331
123
adjectival anaphora with a property-denoting expression taken as antecedent.3,4 For
example, if we paraphrase (1) as ‘The President of Belarus is blacklisted as such’ we
naturally understand that the anaphoric pronoun such stands in this sentence for ‘the
President of Belarus’. Similarly in cases of sentences containing an as-phrase and a
proper name (as in Forbes’ example ‘Lex fears Clark, not as such but as Superman’) the
proper name is understood as standing for a property, and that is why it can be replaced
by the pronoun such which takes an adjective as an antecedent.
From the syntactical point of view as-prepositional phrases are adjuncts5 and
predicate modifiers (Carnie 2006: 164, 168).6 In our Lukashenko story he was
blacklisted as the President of Belarus but not as the chairman of BOC. Intuitively,
the sentences (1) and (2) paraphrased as (10) and (20),
(10) The President of Belarus is blacklisted as the President of Belarus
(20) The chairman of the BOC is not blacklisted as the chairman of the BOC
Could both be true. In such paraphrases a prepositional as-phrase modifies a
predicate (Figs. 1, 2):
Sentences (1) and (2) are ambiguous and could be understood as stating that the
referent of a description (Lukashenko) is (is not) blacklisted or that the referent of a
description is (is not) blacklisted as the President of Belarus (as the BOC chairman).
In the last case the sentences are understood in a way in which the descriptive
content of a description modifies the predicate (Fig. 3).
The codenoting descriptions ‘the BOC chairman’ and ‘the President of Belarus’
have different descriptive content which modifies the main predicate differently,
and that is why the change of one description to another could affect the sentence
truth-conditions. In effect, this possible change in truth-condition blocks the
3 (Carlson 2003: 1231): ‘A wide variety of other anaphoric forms, beyond personal pronouns and
temporal anaphora, make reference to an extensive array of other types of things. […] Other forms take as
antecedents phrases that are not NPs. […] ‘such’ takes a modifier […] If intelligent students attend
college, such students usually do very well.’ (Landman and Morzycki 2003: 140–141): ‘Such, then, can
be interpreted as a property of individuals that realize a contextually supplied kind.’ Landman (2006: 56):
‘As observed above, examples like the following […] suggest an account of such as a property variable,
as such appears to pick up the reference of a preceding adjective […]’. The view that such is anaphoric to
kinds is due to Carlson (1980: 230–236). Arguments supporting the claim that such behaves syntactically
and semantically as an adjective and not as adjectival phrase could be found in Siegel (1994: 482) and in
Wood (2002: 91).
4 Forbes (2006) proposed a solution of The Superman Puzzle based on a semantics of ‘as such’ phrases.
According to him, in cases of intuitive substitution failure, simple sentences with proper names such as
‘Lex fears Superman’ should be understood as containing a covert prepositional phrase ‘Lex fears
Superman as such’ (2006: 157–158). Forbes treats the such pronoun as a case of logophora (a special case
of anaphora in which an expression serving as antecedent is taken itself as a referent of an anaphoric
pronoun, 2006: 155, 158), but contrary to him I think that such is adjectivally anaphoric.
5 Arguments in favor of this view are given by Szabo´ (2003: 395–397).
6 By ‘modification’ I understand here a syntactical relation defined as follows (Carnie 2006: 85): ‘If an XP
(that is, a phrase with some category X) modifies some head Y, then XP must be a sister to Y (i.e., a daughter
to YP).’ Strictly speaking, modifying position for adjuncts on a tree is not to be a sister to N, V, A or P but to
N0, V0, A0 or P0 (Carnie 2006: 162), which constitutes the main syntactical difference between adjuncts and
complements. However I will leave aside this difference in tree position between complements and adjuncts
(so I will present adjuncts in simplified manner as ‘sisters’ to ‘V’ on the trees below).
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substitution of descriptions. I think that we have the same phenomenon in the case
of the substitution failure of coreferential proper names. But before I go further and
present the semantics for modified predicates and outline how the descriptive
content of proper names could be a predicate modifier, I need to mention the
objections against predicate modification by as-phrases raised by Szabo´ (2003).
Szabo´ raised two objections against treating as-phrases as predicate modifiers
(2003: 392). His syntactic objection has a general form and is raised against treating
S
the BOC chairman
NP VP
V PP
modifies
is not blacklisted       as BOC chairman 
Fig. 1 A prepositional as-phrase modification
S
the BOC chairman
NP VP
modifies
anaphora
is not blacklisted        as such
V                 PP
Fig. 2 An adjectival anaphora in a prepositional as-phrase
S
the BOC chairman
NP VP
V                 PP
modifies
is not blacklisted ……..
Fig. 3 A modification by the descriptive content
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as-phrases as modifiers of any sort. If as-phrases are modifiers it should be possible
to iterate them but it is not the case (‘*John earns $50,000 as a judge as a janitor’).
His semantic objection concerns an intuitive semantic connection between initial
and modified predicates. Intuitively from ‘John was invited as a mathematician to
the congress’ it is possible to conclude that ‘John was invited to the congress’ but
for those who advocate predicate modification, an initial and modified predicates
are different, so the connection between them is lost. Keeping in mind these
objections, in the next two sections I will briefly present my proposal for treating as-
phrases as predicate modifiers.
3 Semantic properties of prepositional as-phrases
Semantically, adverbs and adjuncts are used to express a manner, reason, goal, time,
location, condition or purpose of action. Undoubtedly, prepositional phrases used as
adjuncts are not adverbs but from the formal point of view both prepositional
phrases and adverbs have been treated by philosophers in the same manner. In my
proposal of semantics for as-phrases I will use some of the ideas of Romain Clark
(1970) who proposed a logic for predicate modifiers.7 The logic of predicate
modifiers was intensively developed in the seventies8 as an alternative to
Davidsonean (1967) semantics for action sentences. I will briefly present Clark’s
idea in a nutshell. Consider Davidson’s well-known example:
(4) Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.
Davidson’s core idea was to add an additional argument place to action-predicates
for an event-variable which could be bound by a quantifier. So, for example,
sentences like (4) should have a logical form as in (40) (1967: 167):
(40) 9e Strolled S; eð Þ ^ Through the streets of Bologna eð Þ ^ At 2 a:m: eð Þð Þ
As a result of such analysis it is easy to keep an intuitive entailment between (40)
and (4) which was one of the main advantages of the Davidsonean account. Using
standard predicate calculus it is impossible to conclude from ‘Sebastian strolled
through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.’ that ‘Sebastian strolled’, because you need
a 1-place predicate to represent ‘stroll’ and 3-place predicate to represent ‘stroll-
through-at’, so in effect the semantic connection between the predicates is lost.
Moreover, because adverbs and adjuncts are iterable, you can add any number of
7 Besides the standard predicate modifiers Clark proposed the semantics for modifiers that he called
‘fictionalizers’ and ‘negators’ (1970: 329). The characteristic feature of such ‘falsifiers’ is that the
intersection of two extensions—of initial predicate (‘Ming vase’) and of it being modified by a falsifier (‘a
fake Ming vase’)—is an empty set. The proposition of analyzing expressions as ‘fake’, ‘mythical’,
‘simulated’ in a different way is due to Twardowski (1927). In this paper I will consider only standard
modifiers and leave ‘falsifiers’ aside [more can be found in Poli (1991), Cocchiarella (2005), van der
Schaar (2013)].
8 See Lakoff (1970), Parsons (1970), Thomason (1971), Thomason and Stalnaker (1973), van Fraassen
(1973)), Richards (1976), Fulton (1979), Po¨rn (1982).
2334 O. Poller
123
them to ‘stroll’ and in effect obtain plenty of semantically unconnected predicates, a
somewhat undesirable consequence.
Clark (1970) proposed an alternative treatment of adverbs and prepositional
phrases.9 The core of his proposal is the idea that predicates could be built
recursively out of n-place predicate constants by adding modifiers which have
i places in total. So let us take ‘stroll’, for example. It is 1-place predicate. If you add
the adverb ‘slowly’ to ‘stroll’ (getting ‘slowly stroll’) you would not increase the
number of argument places. So ‘slowly’ is a 0-place modifier (as are many other
adverbs). The extension of ‘slowly stroll’ is a subset of the extension of ‘stroll’
(Clark 1970: 325) and that is why you can infer from ‘Sebastian slowly strolled’ that
‘Sebastian strolled’ but not the other way around. This type of adverbial entailment
failure is known as Non-Entailment (Davidson 1967; Katz 2008). Now take ‘at’ and
‘through’. Each of them are 1-place modifiers and if you add them to ‘stroll’ (getting
‘stroll-through-at’) you will increase the number of argument-places and will get a
new 3-place predicate out of a 1-place initial one. You can infer from ‘Sebastian
strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.’ (Davidson 1967: 167) that
‘Sebastian strolled’ because the new 3-place predicate is connected with the initial
1-place predicate ‘stroll’ by a requirement that an object occupying the first place of
the triple (Sebastian) should belong to the extension of ‘stroll’ (this type of
entailment is called Drop). I will leave aside a syntactical definition of adjuncts [see
(Carnie 2006: 162; 2008: 151)] together with all syntactic features specific for
adjuncts such as iteration, reordering [called Permutation, see (Davidson 1967; Katz
2008)] and the ability of adjuncts to stand next to each other (Carnie 2006: 168). By
‘an adjunct predication’ I will understand predication fulfilling Non-Entailment and
Drop semantic requirements [see (Davidson 1967; Katz 2008)].
Except for the mentioned adverbial entailment properties, sentences with as-
phrases have one more type of entailment. I will use one of Szabo´’s examples
(2003: 406) to explain it. Consider: ‘John is rational as a chess-player’. Applying
Drop we are able to infer from this that John is rational. But intuitively we can’t
infer that John is rational simpliciter—he is rational in quite a specific way, that is,
as a chess-player (compare a similar case with another prepositional phrase (Szabo´
2003: 400): ‘I am happy about the news’. Intuitively, you can’t infer that I am happy
simpliciter). From the conclusion you get after applying Drop, ‘X is u’, you cannot
infer that ‘X is u simpliciter’.10 The Drop entailment seems to be unproblematic
whereas conditions for the simpliciter entailment are not so easy to discern (cf.
Szabo´ 2003: 403–404). It seems that it is possible to infer from Aas B is C that A is C
simpliciter when for any D (such that AasD is C is true) both AasD is C and
Aas D is C are true (so there is no need to qualify, ‘She likes him as a philosopher
and not as a philosopher—she simply likes him’) but this condition could be too
strong, so I leave this entailment unsolved.
9 A similar treatment can be found in (McConnell-Ginet 1982).
10 Katz (2008: 229) takes cases like these as supplying the claim that state verbs (contrary to events
verbs) could be restricted from Drop.
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4 Modified predicates semantics
I propose to treat prepositional as-phrases (‘invited as a mathematician’) as 0-place
predicate modifiers. Unlike other prepositional phrases, as-phrases do not increase
the number of argument-places (‘invited’), and, unlike adverbs, they do not modify
a predicate with all its argument places as a whole. Instead, they modify it on one
argument-place only. Imagine a situation in which an object d is an agent of two
simultaneous actions, A and B, but only one of these actions is such that d is doing it
as u. Szabo´ attempted to give an appropriate truth-conditions for such a situation by
means of a requirement that only one action from A and B was a part of d’s state u. I
will preserve the spirit of such an intuition but instead of assuming a mereology of
states and events I will use the inclusion relation between predicates’ extensions (we
will see that these two ideas, whilst the same in spirit, will give different results, see
footnote 14). Note that if you know that d is doing A and B and is u, you can’t infer
that A or B is done by d as u (by Non-Entailment). This entailment failure shows
that the extension of a modified predicate doing A asu although depending on the
extensions of A and u (by Drop), is not fully determined by them. As we see, the
Non-Entailment property is the key property in solving the failure of the substitution
puzzle. Now let me present the core of modified predicates analysis.
4.1 Syntax
The core idea is simple: intuitively, predicate modifiers make predicates from
predicates (see Clark 1970: 320; Po¨rn 1982: 294; Thomason and Stalnaker 1973:
201; van Fraassen 1973: 104, 107). Formally predicates are built from predicate
constants in a recursive way and, due to this, we will use the term ‘predicate’ to
refer to all kinds of predicates—atomic predicates (predicate constants), predicate
abstracts, modified predicates and modified predicate abstracts.
Let us start from modifiers. By modifier we will understand all predicates
abstracted from an atomic formula or a conjunction of atomic formulas with one
free variable, e.g., kx:QðxÞ; kx:ðPðxÞ ^ QðxÞÞ. I assume for simplicity that
modifiers are subclass of predicates abstracts and have no free occurrence of
variables. Now I will define how atomic predicates are modified:
Definition 1 If Q is a n-place predicate constant and (kx:u) is a modifier then
Qikx:u is n-place predicate modified by (kx:u) on ith argument place of Q (where
1 B i B n).
Notation ‘kx:u’ means that a predicate Q is modified by a predicate kx:u on ith
argument place: Q y1; . . .; yi
|{z}
kx:u
; . . .; yn
0
B
@
1
C
A. We can treat u as complex adjective—it
can’t change the number of arguments of a predicate (as we remember, it is 0-place
modifier). Let me give an example: greet is a two-place predicate, uðxÞ is a formula
with one free variable in which u means ‘a host of a party’. greet1kx:u, greet
2
kx:u are
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predicates built via modification from the predicate constant greet; we read them ‘as
a host of a party x greets y’ (modification on the 1st argument place) and as ‘x greets
y as a host of a party’ (modification on the 2nd argument place). We will use a
simplifying convention and in case a modifier is a predicate abstracted from an
atomic formula, PðxÞ, we will simply write ‘QiP’ instead of ‘Qikx:P xð Þ’ and in case Q is
1-place predicate we will write ‘QP’ instead of ‘Q
1
P’.
It is a remarkable fact about sentences with prepositional phrases that they can often
be structurally ambiguous when it is not clear what exactly a prepositional phrase
modifies. Consider the example of such a sentence represented in Fig. 4 below11.
By modifying the same predicate see on different argument places we could avoid
the structural ambiguity and emphasize the meaning which could not be emphasized
by a conjunction of predicates. The sentence ‘Sherlock saw the man and was using
binoculars’ is true in a situation in which Sherlock saw the man ‘with the unaided eye’
and was using binoculars (for example, scratching his knee with them). Intuitively the
truth-conditions of the sentence describing the situation on the left picture differ from
the truth-conditions of the sentence with a conjunction of two predicates.
I allow predicate modification only on one (ith) argument place and do not say
how to modify a predicate on other argument-places or on the same argument place
again (I do not allow for iteration).12 Nevertheless, the iteration of as-phrases is
preserved in a limited form, because I allow that predicates abstracted from a
conjunction of atomic formulas could be modifiers. Modifiers could be iterated by
conjoining with and connective. In that way the Szabo´ example ‘*John earns
$50,000 as a judge as a janitor’ is ungrammatical (in the same way as ‘*John eats his
steak with a fork with a knife’ because you cannot saturate the same argument
position twice) but paraphrased with a conjunction (‘John earns $50,000 as a judge
and as a janitor’) becomes grammatical (this is my response to Szabo´’s syntactic
objection).
Now let me say a few words about the modification of predicate abstracts.
Although a predicate could be abstracted from any formula, I will limit predicate
abstracts which could be modified to predicates abstracted from atomic formulas
and the negations of atomic formulas, kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þ and kx: Q z1; . . .; znð Þ. A
modifier ky:w modifies a predicate abstract on ith argument place of Q (written
11 This picture is taken from von Fintel, Kai. 24.903 Language and its Structure III: Semantics and
Pragmatics, Spring 2005. (MIT OpenCourseWare: Massachusetts Institute of Technology), http://ocw.
mit.edu/courses/linguistics-and-philosophy/24-903-language-and-its-structure-iii-semantics-and-pragmatics-
spring-2005 (Accessed 26 May, 2014). License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA.
12 It seems that in natural language as-phrases could be iterated and could modify a modified predicate
on the same argument place or on different argument place. Consider for example: ‘Teryl Austin has been
confirmed as being hired as the Lions new defensive coordinator’ (example from ‘World News’, accessed
11 July, 2014; http://article.wn.com/view/2014/01/18/Lions_hire_Teryl_Austin_as_defensive_coordin
ator_retain_8_fr/). Intuitively, it is not only the case that Teryl Austin has been confirmed as being
hired and as being the Lions new defensive coordinator (conjunction of modifiers), but he has been
confirmed as being hired as the Lions new defensive coordinator (modification of a predicate confirmed
by the already modified predicate hired as a defensive coordinator). Also a predicate could be modified
on several argument-places, e.g., ‘As a cardiologist, I refuse to buy you a box of Havana cigars as a
birthday gift’.
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‘ðkx:uÞiky:w’ in general notation).13 Formulas with all kinds of predicates are built in
a standard way.
4.2 Semantics
A few proposals concerning the semantics of modified predicates could be found in
the literature and I will briefly mention one important moral which could be drawn
from them before I explain my own proposal. As we said earlier, Clark (1970: 325)
proposed treating a 0-place modifier such as ‘slowly’ in such a way that, when
added to a predicate ‘slowly strolled’, it gives you a subset of ‘stroll’. But exactly
which subset from a family of subsets of the predicate extension does it give? In
order to answer this question it seems very natural to add a choice function to
Clark’s account (e.g. Po¨rn 1982: 296). The role of a choice function would be to
pick up one subset from the family of subsets of a predicate’s extension. Bas van
Fraassen (1973) and James Fulton (1979) noted a serious problem with such an
addition. I will use one of George Lakoff’s examples (1970: 5) to explain it. The
problem appears when predicates have exactly the same extension. Consider a
13 I will preserve the intuition that a modified predicate abstract kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w and a predicate
abstracted from a formula with a modified predicate kx:Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
 
are one and the same predicate
(so you can take a modifier ‘in and out’ of a predicate abstract, see Theorem I in Sect. 8).
Sherlock saw the man using binoculars [with binoculars]
Fig. 4 A modification of a predicate on different argument places
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situation in which there are three guys, Albert (a), Bernard (b) and Clyde (c), and
each of them ate a hotdog and drank a beer. Let H stand for ‘to eat a hotdog’ and B
stand for ‘to drink a beer’. These two predicates have the following interpretation:
IðHÞ ¼ a; b; cf g, IðBÞ ¼ a; b; cf g. ‘Slowly’ is a modifier and is supposed to be
analyzed as a choice function on the family of subsets of extension of a predicate
(minus the empty set). Because it is a function it would necessarily pick up exactly
the same subsets in the case of coextensive predicates, so it would necessarily be so
that exactly the same guys who slowly ate a hotdog also slowly drank a beer, which
is unintuitive. That is why it seems reasonable to return to Clark’s idea (1970: 325)
and let an interpretation I assign to a modified predicate MQ (formed from a
predicate Q by prefixing a modifying operator M of degree zero) a subset of the
extension assigned to Q: I MQð Þ ¼ MQð ÞMg QMg. Subsets assigned to modified
coextensive predicates could differ, for example:
I SlowlyHð Þ ¼ b; cf g; I SlowlyHð Þ  I Hð Þ;
I Slowly Bð Þ ¼ af g; I Slowly Bð Þ  I Bð Þ:
Taking these arguments into account I defined an interpretation of modified pred-
icates in the following way (for simplicity I will give first the definition of 1-place
predicates Q and P) (Fig. 5).
The definition of the interpretation of a modified predicate has the following
general form:
Definition 2 If Q is a n-place predicate constant, P is a 1-place predicate constant
and x is a variable, then I w;th i Qikx:P xð Þ
 
2 P d1; . . .; di; . . .; dnh i 2 I w;th i Qð Þ : di

2 I w;th i Pð ÞgÞ:
A modified predicate is still a predicate—it is interpreted as a subset of the
extension of the predicate being modified, a set of ordered n-tuples of objects of a
domain. However, there is an additional condition: it should be such a set of n-tuples
that every ith element in n-tuples fulfills the descriptive content u with respect to the
time and world of evaluation. This condition is needed to avoid the unintuitive
1-place predicate 1-place predicate 
‘brave’ ‘bridge player’
‘brave as a bridge player’
Fig. 5 A modification of 1-place predicate
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consequence that an n-tuple could belong to the extension of a modified predicate,
despite the fact that the ith element in the n-tuple does not fulfill the descriptive
content which modifies the predicate. In that way the interpretation of a modified
predicate is related to the extension of the predicate being modified (we get Drop
from Definition 2 which is a response to Szabo´’s semantic objection).14
So let us return to the story with Lukashenko. It is possible to be the President of
Belarus and to visit Austria without visiting this country as the President of Belarus
because a person could belong to the extension of ‘to visit Austria’ ðIðAÞÞ and to the
extension of ‘to be the President of Belarus’ ðIðPÞÞ but not to the extension of ‘to
visit Austria as the president of Belarus’ ðIðAPÞÞ. The extension of this last predicate
is a subset of the extension of the set of people who are visiting Austria and are
presidents of Belarus (singleton), and this subset could be empty (Fig. 6).
In such a way somebody could have a property u but not a property ‘u asw’ or
could have a property ‘u asw’ but not a property u in any other way (to be
u only asw). For example, the extension of the modified predicate ‘to give an
interview as a boxer’ is a subset of people who gives an interview. Intuitively we
could say about Madonna that she belongs to the set of people who gives an
interview (GI) but not to the subset of those who give interviews as a boxer
. Intuitively, we could say about Michael Phelps that he
took part in the Olympic Games (PO) but only as a swimmer (POswimmer), so we
would not find him in any other subset of people taking part in the Olympic Games,
.15 Also if somebody has a property u and a property w, we
could not conclude that that he has a property ‘u asw’ (by Non-Entailment). The
failure of making such a conclusion was noticed by Aristotle (On Interpretation XI
20b 35): ‘Thus, again, whereas, if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot
combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker.’
Modifiers are closed under conjunction.
14 Note that the interpretation of QP and PQ predicates could differ. In case of IðQPÞ and I PQð Þ we have
the same requirement that their extension should be a subset of I Qð Þ \ I Pð Þ set. Nothing restrains these
sets from being different. But, assuming a mereology of states (as Szabo´ did), you would get quite an
unintuitive result. Let me briefly explain. What does it mean on Szabo´’s (2003) account that somebody,
say d, belongs to IðQPÞ and I PQð Þ? This means [2003: 404 def. (51b)] that there are two states, s and s0,
such that d is agent of both of them and P sð Þ; Q s0ð Þ are true. Moreover, because d 2 I PQð Þ, it should be so
that s is a part of s0. In a similar way, because d 2 I QPð Þ, it also should be so that s0 is a part of s. This
means that s and s0 is one and the same state. I find this consequence quite unwelcome. Imagine that Jones
is sentenced as a tax-dodger and as a prisoner he does not pay taxes. So his state s if being a prisoner is a
part of his state s0 of being a taxes nonpayer. In a similar way, his state s0 is a part of state s. This means
that his state s of being a prisoner and his state s0 of being a nonpayer of taxes is one and the same state.
This means in turn that every predicate true of s should also be true of s0. Imagine that Jones is a
convinced anarchist and is unhappy to be imprisoned but is happy not to pay taxes. So he is both in a
happy and an unhappy state. Assuming a mereology of states, Szabo´ was trying to avoid such a dilemma
(2003: 400), but as we see, the dilemma still remains. Compare a similar example: ‘As a suspect, Jones
refuses to make a statement’/‘As refusing to make a statement, Jones becomes a suspect’. On Szabo´’s
account Jones’s refusing-to-make-a-statement state and becoming-a-suspect state should be one and the
same state but intuitively these states are two different states.
15 I assume in this example that it is only possible to take part in the Olympic Games as an athlete of
some kind.
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Definition 3 If Q is a n-place predicate constant, x is a variable, and
ðkx:uÞ; ðkx:wÞ are modifiers, then I w;th i Qikx: u^wð Þ
 
¼ I w;th i Qikx:u
 
\ I w;th i Qikx:w
 
.
In a similar way, modifiers could be closed under disjunction but I do not add such a
definition. I need to say that the generalized logic of modified predicates seems to be a
hard nut to crack. One of the puzzling things that comes to mind is a definition of a
modifier’s negation (‘but now I am visiting your school not as a police officer’). You
cannot define it simply as I w;th i Qikx:u
 
¼ I w;th i Qð ÞnI w;th i Qikx:u
 
, because such a
definition excludes the possibility for somebody who does Qasu to do Qnot asu
simultaneously (‘I came to your school as a police officer but also I came to your school
not as a police officer—as a father of one of the pupils’). You cannot define the
modifier’s negation also as I w;th i Qikx:u
 
¼ P I w;th i Qð Þ
 nI w;th i Qikx:u
 
, because you
will have exactly the same consequence in case the extension ofQ is a singleton (thanks
to Leszek Wron´ski for discussion here). If you subtract any non-empty set from the
family of subsets ofQ, you will have the empty set, so it will be impossible for someone
to doQasu and to doQnot asu simultaneously. Maybe in order to define what does it
mean that somebody does Qnot as P it would be better to follow the intuition that it
means that somebody does Q in some other way R, where R = P.
The other puzzling thing besides modifier negation is modification by a predicate
abstracted from a formula with temporal operators (‘She blessed him as a future
son-in law’ [as somebody who would be a son-in-law], ‘As a former police officer
[as somebody who was a police officer], he investigated quickly which kid scratched
the car’). In a standard way a formula prefixed with a temporal operator is satisfied
in a model iff the model satisfies the formula without the temporal operator with
respect to a new time-parameter (shifted by the temporal operator). Such a definition
is compositional—we drop the temporal operator and check if the formula without it
is satisfied in a new time-parameter. It is clear that the compositionality is lost in the
case of formulas with predicates modified by a predicate abstracted from a formula
with a temporal operator. Intuitively, a guy who, as a former police officer, now
investigates who scratched the car may have nothing in common with guys who at
some time in the past investigated as police officers who scratched the car. You
cannot simply, as before, shift a time parameter and check the truth-conditions of a
formula without a temporal operator.
In my examples I have mentioned mainly as-phrases used as adjuncts of manner
(‘I will use the rest of the olive oil as a base for a salad dressing’) but besides
expressing a manner as-phrases could be used to express time (‘Ann was fat as a
Fig. 6 ‘To visit Austria as the
president of Belarus’
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child’), reason (‘As a firefighter, John was asked to help in the rescue action’) and
purpose (‘They hired him as a launching engineer’). Maybe as-phrases could be
used to express other characteristics of action or state named by a predicate and it is
not clear if the analysis proposed here covers all types of use. For certain it doesn’t
cover as-phrases used as adjunct of comparison (‘He is in his mid-forties but his
mother still treats him as a child’, ‘He used a spoon as a beer bottle opener’).
Understood in the most classical way, a comparison is an act of comparing thing A
to thing B under respect C. Comparing A to B we are not saying that A is B
(contrary to Definition 2 requirements). Intuitively, when we say ‘Your knife is
blunt because you often use it as screwdriver and as a tent peg’ we do not say that
some particular knife is a screwdriver and is a tent peg (and, as a consequence,
should belong to extensions of these predicates). All we are saying is that this
particular knife is often used in a similar way as screwdrivers are used and in a
similar way as tent pegs are used. So we can’t use the semantics proposed here to
analyze such examples because otherwise all objects such as a screwdriver, a tent
peg, a knife, a sharpened ferule, etc. would belong to the extension of ‘a
screwdriver’/’a tent peg’ predicates, which is unintuitive consequence. It seems to
me that in case of as-phrases used as an adjunct of comparison we should give up
the requirement that the object taking the ith argument-place should belong to the
extension of a modifying predicate (in such a way as-phrases used as an adjunct of
comparison may be analyzed in the same manner as adverbs in Clark’s semantics).
5 Modification of a predicate by the descriptive content of a proper
name
As I noted earlier, the phenomenon of substitution failure is quite widespread and
seems to concern not only names but other corefering NPs, such as group terms,
plural terms, natural kind terms and definite descriptions. All these expressions
possess a descriptive content that determines an expression’s reference.16 As we
have seen, sentences like (1) and (2), except of exemplifying the substitution failure,
are ambiguous between modified and unmodified readings. This regular ambiguity
16 An anonymous referee drew my attention to possible extension of the proposed account to indexicals.
It seems, however, that there is no straightforward way to extend this account to sentences with
indexicals, e.g. ‘He (pointing at young Cassius Clay’s photo in a newspaper) was never beaten but he
(pointing at Muhammad Ali in another photo) was beaten five times’. Contrary to sentences with other
coreferential NPs this is not a descriptive content of indexicals which is used as an adjunct (e.g. ‘male
individual’ for ‘he’) because that is stable and thus could not modify the same predicate differently. The
descriptive content which is used as an adjunct in this example is a contextually salient property (different
in two acts of demonstration) possessed by a referent of an indexical, e.g. ‘a boxer named [cassius clay]’,
‘a boxer named [muhammad ali]’. Firstly, it is unclear how one could extract such a property (should it be
a description at all?), and secondly it is far from obvious how one should semantically connect such a
property with an indexical. On the other hand, once the property is extracted and by ‘He (pointing) was
never beaten but he (pointing) was beaten five times’ one understands something like ‘He, as a boxer
named [cassius clay], was never beaten but he, as a boxer named [muhammad ali] was beaten five times’
or something like ‘He was never beaten before 1964 but he was beaten five times after 1964’, one can use
the analysis of predicate modification presented here.
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provides evidence that the descriptive content of a nominal phrase except for
determining its extension functions as truth-conditionally relevant adjuncts and
constitute an additional contribution to the truth-conditions (so I entirely agree with
Szabo´’s proposal on this point). Regularity and truth-conditional relevance in its
turn shows that the descriptive content is not suggested or implicated. I agree with
Forbes (2006: 158) that the as-phrase invokes the mode of presentation connected
with an expression and propose to treat this ‘ways of giving’ in a similar way as
adverbs are treated—as predicates modifiers.
In this section I will explain how the descriptive content of proper names could
modify a predicate and briefly sketch how the cases of substitution failure of
coreferential proper names in simple sentences could be solved with the help of the
formal semantics presented here (I will concern myself with proper names only and
leave aside pseudonyms such as ‘Superman’ or ‘Batman’. For a detailed solution of the
puzzle see (Poller (under review a)). Consider our example (3) slightly modified as (30):
(30) Cassius Clay was never beaten.
We have mixed intuitions about this sentence, because it seems true and untrue the
same time. ‘Cassius Clay’ refers to Muhammad Ali and it was true about him that he
never lost a fight when he fought as Cassius Clay but he lost five fights in his boxing
career. But when we paraphrase (30) as (300) or (3¢¢¢) using as-phrase, both sentences
seems true:
(300) Cassius Clay was never beaten as Cassius Clay.
(3¢¢¢) Cassius Clay was never beaten as such.
The reason why we have mixed intuitions about sentences from the puzzle such as (30)
is because they are ambiguous between modified and unmodified readings. We could
replace (300) with (3¢¢¢), using the adjectivally anaphoric pronoun such which stands for a
property. The possibility of such replacement supports the claim that proper name in the
as-phrase in (300) is understood as standing for a property, so the predicate in (300) is
modified not by a proper name but by a descriptive content of a proper name. So the
idea at play behind the semantics of predicate modification by proper names is simple:
the modifying content of a proper name n is a predicate kx:u abstracted from the
formula u of a definite description iy:u connected with a proper name n. In order to
write this idea as a definition I need to go through some syntactic definitions and to
explain what it means for a description ‘to be connected with a proper name n’.
Despite being a descriptivist (in my opinion speakers do associate definite
descriptions with a proper name), I do not take the phenomenon of predicate
modification by the descriptive content of proper names as an argument in favor of the
descriptive theory of reference fixing. If you prefer another theory of names you could
also accept the phenomenon of predicate modification by descriptive content of
names—for example you can hold that descriptions are contained in mental files
connected with names and used by speakers to modify predicates but nevertheless the
descriptions do not semantically determine name’s reference. Over the next two pages
I will outline a way in which proper names could be formally represented. This formal
representation is compatible with descriptive thesis about reference determination,
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that is, with thesis that the reference of a name is semantically determined via
satisfaction of descriptive properties. This means that the interpretation of a term
which formally represents a proper name depends on the interpretation of a description
which, in turn, depends on the interpretation of the predicates it contains. If you do not
accept descriptivism you can find a way to connect sets of descriptions with names
without an interpretation dependency. Note that the majority of model domains
contain no speakers, and that is why I will leave aside all epistemic objections raised
against descriptivism and concern on modal and circularity objections only. I am not
defending descriptivism in this paper and epistemic objections stay unanswered here (I
answered them in Poller (under review b)).
I represent proper names formally as special terms which I call ‘name-terms’. Such
terms are rigid but semantically complex and receive their interpretation via a special
sort of definite descriptions. I will briefly outline the idea behind such formal
representation (a full version of the formal representation of proper names in
accordance with the descriptive theory of reference can be found in (Poller 2014). Let
me start from iota-terms. In a standard way they are built via applying a i-operator to a
formula u and designate with respect to a parameter of evaluation if there is only one
object which fulfills u in a set assigned to the evaluation parameter (otherwise iota-
terms fail to designate, Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998: 254, 104). Iota-terms designate
contingently with respect to possible worlds but if you add time as another point of
evaluation, iota-terms would also designate contingently with respect to times. For
example, take ‘the Pope’. It designates different people with respect to different times
in our world (or fails to designate). This expression does not designate somebody in
particular unless you add ‘present’ to it, getting ‘the present Pope’, or you express a
time explicitly (e.g. ‘the Pope in 1967’). ‘The present Pope’, ‘the Pope in 1967’
expressions designate exactly one and the same person (if designates at all) with
respect to a possible world and any time. So by ‘a definite description’ I understand a
special kind of iota-terms of the form ix:½iu, where ‘[i]’ is a notational variant of theni
operator (‘true at ti’) taken after (Rini and Cresswell 2012). The time operator [i] fixes a
time of evaluation, so for any world w, time t and assignment g I
g
w;th i ix:½iu
  ¼
I
g
w;tih i ix:uð Þ. In other words, a definite description ix:½iu designates with respect to any
time t the object designated by iota-term ix:uwith respect to time ti. I will call definite
descriptions ix:½iu actual with respect to ti.
As we know from the previous section the account of modified predicates presented
here is not general, so our most complicated modifier could be a predicate abstracted
out of a conjunction of atomic formulas with one free variable. That is why I can use
only some of definite descriptions ix:½iu. To represent proper names formally we need
a language L with a set of distinguished predicates N1; N2; N3; . . .ð Þ which we will
read as ‘called a’, where ‘a’ is a string of sounds or an inscription [arguments
supporting such view on verbs of naming could be found in (Geurts 1997: 326–328),
see also (Matushansky 2008: 578, 580–581)]. I will use symbol ‘!x:u’ for iota-terms
ix:uwith only one variable x which occurs free inu. All descriptions !x:½iuwhich we
connect with a name-term have a form of !x:½i Nj xð Þ ^ Q xð Þ
 
, where ‘Nj’ is a
distinguished predicate and ‘Q’ is a 1-place undistinguished, e.g. ‘the (present)
president called [obama]’. A set of such descriptions will be called ‘CL’ (see Sect. 7,
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Def.VI.S(a)). We avoid Kripke’s circularity argument by treating [obama] as a
physical object (a sound or an inscription) which belongs to a model domain, not to a
language. It is used as a mark to distinguish somebody (cf. Mill 1889/2011: 41), but the
property of ‘being called [obama]’ is not sufficient to determine the reference because
a lot of people are called so.
In order to avoid circularity we also need to be sure that the definite descriptions
connected with a proper name contain no proper names. That is why we consider
two languages, L and Lþ (L  Lþ). Let me start from language L. All terms it
contains are variables and iota-terms (so there are no individual constants in L). We
will use definite descriptions from L to give interpretation of name-terms from Lþ.
The idea behind connecting proper names with descriptions is simple: we let name-
terms (formally representing names) designate through equivalence classes of
descriptions which designate one and the same individual and contain one and the
same predicate Nj (relation R, see Sect. 7, Def.VI.S(c)). We need this last
requirement in order to be able to formally distinguish formally two co-referring but
distinct proper names (to represent them as two different name-terms). Because
descriptions denote contingently we need to define an equivalence relation not on a
set of descriptions CL but on a set of pairs containing a description and a world in
which description designates (set D, see Sect. 7, Def.VI.S(b)). So for example take
two descriptions, ‘the planet called [fosforus]’, ‘the planet called [hesperus]’ (we
name them c1, c2 respectively). Both descriptions c1, c2 designate in our world w,
but pairs c1; wh i; c2; wh i will belong to different equivalence classes because c1
contains predicate ‘called [fosforus]’ while c2 contains different predicate ‘called
[hesperus]’. This idea is represented schematically in Fig. 7.
I won’t go into formal details (full versions of definitions can be found in Sect. 7)
and will instead just explain the key steps. In order to define an interpretation of a
name-term ni I need two functions—one which connects ni with an equivalence
class (function Q , Def.VI.S(e)) and the other which takes an equivalence class and
gives the object designated by every description in the class (function F,
Def.VI.S(d)). I presented this idea in Fig. 8.
The first function Q for every name-term ni gives an equivalence class,
and the second function F for every equivalence class
equivalence classes
‘Phosphorus’
‘Hesperus’
Fig. 7 Different equivalence classes connected with co-referring names
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gives an object designated by every description in that class,
. Now, letting a model M be a model for Lþ we can
define an interpretation of a name-term in it as follows:
I 
w;th i nið Þ ¼ F Q nið Þ
 
:
In effect I have exactly what the description theory of reference postulates: new
name-terms refer to objects via definite descriptions and that definite descriptions
are used only to fix a reference and are not synonymous with name-terms. Such
terms are obstinately rigid and not sensitive to the scope differences of temporal and
modal operators in formulas without predicate modification by the descriptive
content of a term (cf. Poller 2014, for proofs see also Poller 2014).
Now I will return to the question of modification. I let name-terms occupy an
argument position of predicate abstracts only, ðkx:uÞðnÞ. Let me add some syntactic
definitions (I will present them here in a simplified manner, see Def. V.R13, R17,
R18, R22 in Sect. 7):
5.1 Syntax
Definition 4 If n is a name-term, then n is a modifier;
Definition 5 If kx:Q y1; . . .; ymð Þð Þ, kx: Q y1; . . .; ymð Þð Þ are predicate abstracts
and n is a naming term, then ðkx:Q y1; . . .; ymð ÞÞin, kx: Q y1; . . .; ymð Þð Þin are
predicates abstracts modified by n on ith argument-place of Q (where 1 i m);
Definition 6 If kx:uð Þin is a modified predicate abstract and n is a name-term, then
kx:uð Þin nð Þ is a formula.
Note that in case a predicate abstract is modified by a name-term, such a predicate
and a name-term could form a formula iff the name-term occupying an argument
place is the same as modifying name-term. As I noticed earlier, sentences as (30)
could be paraphrased as (3¢¢¢) with the anaphoric pronoun such (cf. ‘Lex fears
Superman as such’, Forbes 2006: 158). Treating this case of anaphora in the most
classical way, namely as a phenomenon of the interpretation dependence of
occurrence of one expression on the interpretation of an occurrence of another
expression, it is natural to suppose that the anaphoric pronoun takes as an antecedent
an occurrence of the expression explicitly expressed in the same sentence (a proper
name) which is the most salient occurrence of an expression.
Now I will return to the semantics of predicate modification by the descriptive
content of a proper name. As I said earlier, the idea is quite simple: a formula
Fig. 8 An interpretation of a name-term ni
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kx:uð Þin nð Þ is satisfied in a model with respect to a world w and a time t iff there is a
description !y:½jw in the set of descriptions for the term n and the worldw such that the
model satisfies kx:uð Þiky:w nð Þ with respect to w; th i. In this definition I am trying to
encapsulate the following idea: if we say that NN is doing something as NN, we mean
by this that there is a (unspecified) way of describing NN such that NN is doing
something in that way. All I have to do now is to explain what is the set of descriptions
for the term n and the world w (I drop time-parameter t because, as I have said earlier,
by a definite description I understand a iota-term ix:½iuwith a fixed time-parameter).
What we have now is a connection between name-terms and equivalence classes of
description-world pairs provided by Q function, for example:
We will evaluate formulas with predicates modified by a descriptive content of
proper names with respect to a possible world w and a time t. With respect to w we
want to take into account only those descriptions which designate in w. That is why
we need a function (let us call it hB) which for a term n and a world w returns a
‘smaller’ equivalence class of those descriptions which denote in w and is undefined
in case there is no such class (see Sect. 7, Def.VI.S(f), Def.VI.S(g)). For example,
for a term n and world w1 h
 gives you the following set:
Now to have a set of descriptions (not pairs of descriptions and world) we take the
first projection p1 of h n; w1ð Þ which gives a set of the first elements from every
pair in a class:
p1 h
 n;w1ð Þ
  ¼ ci; cj
 
:
Now we can define a modification of a predicate by a descriptive content of a proper
name as follows:
Definition 7 M gwtj kx:uð Þin nð Þ iff there is a description !y:½jw 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ,
such that M gwtj kx:uð Þiky:w nð Þ.
There are two interesting consequences for this definition. Note that although a name-
term n is obstinately rigid (it refers to the same thing regardless of changes of time and
world-parameters), its modifying descriptive content (ky:w obtained from a definite
description !y:½jw by dropping fixing-time operator ½j) changes with respect to time
and world of evaluation. This means that—while the name-term is not sensitive to the
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scope differences of modal and temporal operators—its descriptive content is
sensitive. InDefinition 7we step from a formula ðkx:uÞin nð Þ to a formula ðkx:uÞiky:w nð Þ
and this last formula is satisfied in a standard way, when the referent of n belongs to
the extension of the predicate ðkx:uÞiky:w regardless of satisfying any descriptive
content. All the term’s descriptive content does here is pick up the reference, and it is
inessential in what way it does so because all you need for truth-conditions is just the
referent itself and a property named by a predicate. Therefore, it is without any
significance if the descriptive content of the name-term lies within or beyond the
scope of a modal or temporal operator—nothing depends on a change in content. But
when you want the descriptive content to express the additional circumstances of an
action that should be taken into account you make the descriptive content a part of the
predicate. The name-term is still not sensitive to points of evaluation but the predicate
modified by the descriptive content of a term is sensitive. When we say that NN is
doing something as NN we understand by it that NN is doing something in a
descriptive way w actual with respect to a time (and a world) of evaluation. So by
saying (3) (‘Cassius Clay was never beaten whereas Muhammad Ali lost five times’)
we convey the idea that the greatest boxer never lost a fight during the period of time
when he was a boxer actually called ‘Cassius Clay’ (and he lost five times after
changing his name to ‘Muhammad Ali’). What important conclusion could possibly
be drawn from name-term’s rigidity and the sensitivity of predicates modified by the
name’s descriptive content to points of evaluation? Perhaps in the case of proper
names it is wrong to equate their rigidity with regards to the sameness of the truth-
conditions of the two readings with wide and narrow scopes of sentences containing
the term and a temporal and a modal operator.17 For example, take a sentence
kx:Q xð Þð Þin nð Þ and the possibility operator . Applied in a wide-scope reading,
 kx:Q xð Þð Þin nð Þ, the possibility operator shifts a world of evaluation so the modifying
descriptive content would be taken from a new world-parameter. But in a narrow-
scope reading, kx:  Q xð Þð Þin nð Þ, we take first a modifying descriptive content from a
world of evaluation and then check if it is the case that the term’s referent belongs to
its extension. A term’s descriptive content taken from different world-parameters
could differ, so the predicates modified by it could be different and in effect it is
possible for formulas with both a narrow and a wide scope to differ in truth-
conditions. This is only a hypothetical possibility which cannot be proven yet because
of a limitation of predicate abstracts which could be modified to predicates abstracted
from atomic formulas and negations of atomic formulas. Nevertheless, it is possible
to prove that formulas  kx:Q xð Þð Þin nð Þ and kx: Q xð Þð Þin nð Þ with different scope
of negation have no equal truth-conditions (see Statement I in Sect. 7). In the case of
modified predicates, kx:uð Þiky:w, we are talking about u and a way of doing itw. But in
case a predicate abstract is modified by a name-term n; ðkx:uÞin, we are not talking
about any particular way of doing u. Consider:
17 Compare Kripke’s remark about rigidity and scopes of alethic modalities in (1980: 12 footnote 15).
Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998: 217) characterize a term’s rigidity as the equality of the broad scope to the
narrow scope reading.
2348 O. Poller
123
(5) Lukashenko is not blacklisted (as such)
We can write (5) either as (50) or as (500):
(50) kx: V xð Þð Þn nð Þ
(500)  kx:V xð Þð Þn nð Þ:
According to Definition 7 (50) is true then there is a description from the set of
descriptions associated with ‘Lukashenko’, for example ‘the BOC chairman called
[lukasˇenko]’, such that it is true about Lukashenko that he is not blacklisted as the
BOC chairman called [lukasˇenko]. As we know from the story in the beginning, (50)
is true. In (500) we deny that there is any description in the set of descriptions
associated with ‘Lukashenko’, such that it is true about him that he is blacklisted in
any way. But he is blacklisted as the President of Belarus called [lukasˇenko], so (500)
is false. It is important to notice that kx: V xð Þð Þn nð Þ and kx:V xð Þð Þn nð Þ could be
true together, that is why it is possible to simultaneously agree and disagree with (5)
and remain consistent. In such cases such as this when we know that there is a
description !y:½ju associated with a proper name n such that d, the referent of n, is
Q asu, d 2 IðQky:uÞ, and we know that there is another description !y:½jw associated
with the proper name such that d 62 IðQky:uÞ, we explicitly express this modifying
content (‘Paderewski is popular as a musician but he is not popular as a politician’).
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for calling my attention to sentences with
modified predicate of identity, ‘to be identical as u’. From a technical point of view,
there is nothing in semantics presented here which restrains you from choosing any
subset of extension of identity predicate as a representation of extension ‘to be
identical asu’ predicate (e.g. you can choose a proper subset, an empty set or the whole
set of pairs d; dh i such that d isu). Could something, taken as u, not be identical with
itself (e.g. taken asw) or not?—At this stage the notion needs further investigation and
thus I leave it open. However, I think that an interpretation ‘to be identical as being
called a’ is simply a set of pairs d; dh i such that d is called a, and that is why I share the
referee’s intuition that there is no true reading of sentences such as ‘Muhammad Ali is
not (identical with) Cassius Clay (as such)’. Let me show that there is no true reading of
negated sentences with a predicate of identity modified by a descriptive content of a
proper name (assuming that an interpretation of ‘to be identical as being called a’ is
simply a set of pairs d; dh i such that d is called a). As I mentioned earlier, sentences
with predicates modified by a descriptive content of proper names and negation are
ambiguous between two readings. One of the readings says that there is a description
!x:½iu in the set of descriptions associated with ‘Muhammad Ali’, such that it is true
about Ali that he as u is not identical with Cassius Clay. Formula u is a conjunction
called muhammad ali½  xð Þ ^ Q xð Þ, where Q is an atomic predicate true of Ali/Cassius.
By definition modifiers are closed under conjunction so for ‘Ali is not identical with
Cassius Clay as being called [muhammad ali] and Q,’ to be true it should be so that Ali
is not identical with Cassius Clay as being called [muhammad ali]. Yet this contradicts
with our assumption—it is highly doubtful that an interpretation of predicates ‘to be
identical as being called a’ differs from the set of pairs d; dh i such that d is called a.
The other reading says that there is no description in the set of descriptions associated
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with ‘Muhammad Ali’ such that it is true about Ali that he is identical with Cassius
Clay in any way. This reading is clearly false for the same reason. Both readings
emerge as being false which means that sentences of the formNN isMMas such, where
NN and MM are coreferential names, are true according to this account (under the
assumption that an interpretation of ‘to be identical as being called a’ is simply a set of
pairs d; dh i such that is called a).
6 Concluding remarks
I raise the hypothesis that sentences with proper names as [Name][Predicate] are
ambiguous between two readings, (I) and (II),
Ið Þ Name½  Predicate½ ,
IIð Þ Name½  Predicate½ 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
modified by Name½ 
:
From a pragmatic point of view readings (I) and (II) are non-equal. For example,
using the criterion of relevance of an input to an individual from The Relevance
Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 265–266), we can predict that reading (I) should
be a default reading. You need more effort to process (II)—you should additionally
take into account circumstances of action expressed by modifying descriptive
content—so (II) would be less relevant to you unless it has a greater cognitive effect
overcoming the additional costs of processing. Consider for example:
(6) The papal nuncio supported an anarchist protest
What you understand as a default is that the papal nuncio supported an anarchist protest
as the papal nuncio, because, read in this way, (6) has the effect of an information bomb
(compared to the information that the papal nuncio supported the protest as a private
person). I agree with Landman (1989: 741) that sentences have preferred readings with
modified predicates when there is a (salient) semantic connection between meanings of a
modifying predicate and a predicate being modified. Consider his example: ‘The
chairman is well-paid’. Both predicates ‘being well-paid’ and ‘being a chairman’ are
semantically related because both concern a job. The stronger the connection is, the
easier it leads to substitution failure (comparative to sentences with less related
predicates, e.g. ‘The chairman wants to eat meat’, 1989: 741).
Unlike definite descriptions, proper names are rigid designators and are not-
sensitive to scope differences. When a proper name’s descriptive content is used
only to pick up the reference and not to modify a predicate, there are no differences
in operators’ scope. Consider:
(7) Romain Gary won the Prix Goncourt in 1975
(8) Romain Gary was the only person who won the Prix Goncourt twice
Sentence (7) could be written as (70) or as (700) (I will use ‘w’ for ‘win’ and ‘n’ for
‘Romain Gary’):
(70) P kx:W xð Þð Þ nð Þ—‘a certain person, Romain Gary, won the Prix Goncourt in
19750;
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(700) P kx:W xð Þð Þn nð Þ—‘a certain person, Romain Gary, won the Prix Goncourt in
1975 (as Romain Gary)’
Formula (70) has exactly the same truth-conditions as formula kx:PW xð Þð Þ nð Þ
because in both cases you check if the certain person, Romain Gary, won the Prix.
He won, so (70) is true. But he won it not as Romain Gary, but as E´mile Ajar. He is
the only author to have won the Prix Goncourt twice. This prize for French language
literature is awarded only once to an author and Gary, who had already received the
prize in 1956, wrote a book as Emile Ajar to receive the prize again. So (700) is false.
In a similar way, if the sentence (8) is understood without modification, it is true (‘a
certain person, Romain Gary, was the only person who won the Prix Goncourt
twice’), but if it is understood as ‘a certain person, Romain Gary, won the Prix
Goncourt twice as Romain Gary’) it is false.
The substitution of coreferential names in simple sentences could fail, because the
different descriptive content of proper names modifies the main predicate differently, so
in effect sentences could have different truth conditions. The double truth conditions of
different readings (simple and modified) are responsible for the mixed intuitions which
speakers feel about such examples. The raised hypothesis about the additional truth-
conditional relevance of descriptive content associated with a proper name allows one to
explain why speakers associate a descriptive content with a proper name—using the
descriptive content as adjuncts, they could express propositions that could not be
expressed in any other way (without as-phrases), for example ‘Romain Gary won the
Prix Goncourt twice but only once as Romain Gary’.
In Appendix I will present a formal machinery [languages L and Lþ (without and
with name-terms)] and prove some useful statements.
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Appendix: The formal representation of modified predicates
The languages L and Lþ are based on first-order predicate logic with identity and
descriptions (I followed Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998). I will skip all standard
definitions and present the definitions that are specific for a formal representation of
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modified predicates. Let me start from the language L which contains only two sorts
of terms: variables and iota-terms.
Definition I The alphabet of L.
A first-order language L contains the following symbols: sentential connectives
^; _; !; $;  ; quantifiers 9; 8; an infinite set of individual variables
x1; x2; x3;   ; an infinite set of predicate constants P1; P2; P3;   , with a positive
integer (an arity) assigned to each of them; identity sign =; the definite descriptions
operator i; the abstraction operator k; temporal operators of past P and future F; an
infinite set of temporal operators [i] (‘true at ti’), where i 2 N; modal operatorsh, ;
an infinite set of distinguished predicate constants N1; N2; N3;   ; a set of
numerical symbols for natural numbers; the left parenthesis (, the right parenthesis ).
Definition II The syntax of L.
Predicate constants and the predicate abstracts, modified atomic predicates and
modified predicate abstracts defined below are predicates of L. An atomic predicate
of L is any predicate constant. The notions of a formula, a term, a predicate and free
variable occurrence are defined as follows:
the notions of a variable (R1), a predicate constant (R2), an atomic formula (R3), u
(R4), u ^ wð Þ, u _ wð Þ, u! wð Þ, u$ wð Þ (R5), Pu, Fu, ½iu (R6),
hu; u ðR7Þ; 8xu; 9xu ðR8Þ; ix:u ðR9Þ; ðkx:uÞ (R10) are defined in a standard way;
R11. if Q is a 1-place predicate constant and x is a variable, then (ðkx:QðxÞÞ is a
modifier. Modifiers contain no free variable occurrences;
R12. if (kx:u), (kx:w) are modifiers, then kx:ðu ^ wÞð Þ is a modifier;
R13. ifQ is a n-place predicate constant and (kx:u) is a modifier thenQikx:u is n-place
atomic predicate modified by kx:uð Þ on ith argument place of Q
(where 1  i  n);
R14. if kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ is a predicate abstract and kx:w is a modifier, then
kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w is a predicate abstract modified by kx:wð Þ on ith
argument place of Q (where 1  i n); the free variable occurrences in
kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w are those of kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ
R15. if kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ is a predicate abstract and kx:wð Þ is a modifier, then
kx: Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w is a predicate abstract modified by kx:wð Þ on ith
argument place of Q (where 1  i n); the free variable occurrences in
kx: Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w are those of kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ;
R16. if Q is a n-place predicate constant, Qikx:u is n-place modified predicate and
z1; . . .; zn is an n-element sequence of variables, then Q
i
kx:u z1; . . .; znð Þ is a
formula in which all variable occurrences in the n-element sequence are free;
R17. if kx:uð Þ is a predicate abstract and s is a term, then kx:uð ÞðsÞ is a formula;
the free occurrences of variables in kx:uð ÞðsÞ are those of kx:uð Þ together
with those of s;
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R18. if ðkx:uÞiky:w is a modified predicate abstract and s is a term, then
ðkx:uÞiky:w sð Þ is a formula; the free occurrences of variables in
ðkx:uÞiky:w sð Þ are those of ðkx:uÞiky:w together with those of s;
R19. nothing else is a formula, a term, a predicate, a modifier and a free
occurrence of a variable.
Notational convention:
• if Q is a 1-place predicate constant and b is a modifier, then instead of ‘Q1b
’ we
will write ‘Qb’;
• if Q is a n-place predicate constant and (kx:P xð Þ) is a modifier, then instead of
‘Qikx:P xð Þ’ we will write ‘Q
i
P’.
Definition III The semantics of L.
A varying domain first-order model M for L is a structure M ¼ D; T;\;W ; Ih i,
such that:
• D is a domain function mapping pairs of possible world and time w; th i to non-
empty sets. The domain of the model is the set [ D w;th i : w 2 W ; t 2 T
 
. We
write DM for the domain of the model M and D w;th i for a value of the function D
for an argument w; th i;
• T is a set of natural numbers and \(‘earlier then’) is a linear order defined on
elements of T (a set T;\ð Þ is thought as a flow of time);
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• I is a function which assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic predicate or
modified atomic predicate of L and a pair w; th i, where w 2 W ; t 2 T , in the
following way:
• if Q is a n-place predicate constant, then I w; th i Qð Þ  DnM;
• I w;th i ¼ð Þ ¼ d; dh i 2 DMf g;
let g be a variable assignment (a mapping that assigns to each free variable x
some member g(x) of the model domain DM) and let Igw;th i be a function which
assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic predicate, a modified predicate or
a term of L and a pair w; th i, where w 2 W , t 2 T , in the following way:
• if x a variable, then Ig
w;th i xð Þ ¼ g xð Þ for any w; th i;
• I  Ig for any g;
the notion of interpretation of terms other then variables and interpretation of
modified predicates and satisfaction of formulas in M are defined as follows:
S1. if Q is a n-place predicate constant and y1; . . .; yn are variables, then
MgwtQ y1; . . .; ynð Þ iff g y1ð Þ; . . .; g ynð Þh i 2 I w; th i Qð Þ;
the notions of satisfaction of u S2ð Þ; ðu ^ wÞ S3ð Þ; ðu _ wÞ S4ð Þ; u!ð
wÞ S5ð Þ; u$ wð Þ S6ð Þ are defined in a standard way;
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S7. if Q is a n-place predicate constant, P is a 1-place predicate constant and x is
a variable, then I w;th i Qikx:P xð Þ
 
2 P d1; . . .; di; . . .; dnh i 2 I w;th i Qð Þ : di 2

I w;th i Pð ÞgÞ;
S8. if Qikx:P xð Þ; Q
i
ky:P yð Þ are n-place atomic predicates modified by kx:PðxÞ,
ky:PðyÞ on ith argument place and x, y are variables, then I w;th i
Qikx:P xð Þ
 
¼ I w;th i Qiky:P yð Þ
 
;
S9. if Q is a n-place predicate constant, x is a variable, and (kx:u), (kx:w) are
modifiers, then I w; th i Qikx: u^wð Þ
 
¼ I w; th i Qikx:u
 
\ I w; th i Qikx:w
 
;
S10. if Q z1; . . .; znð Þ is an atomic formula and kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w is a modified
predicate abstract, then I
g
w; th i kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w
 
¼
d 2 DM : M
g
d
x
	 

wt
Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
8
>
<
>
:
9
>
=
>
;
;
S11. if  Q z1; . . .; znð Þ is a negation of an atomic formula and kx: Qð
z1; . . .; znð ÞÞiky:w is a modified predicate abstract, then Igw; th i kx: Q z1;ððð
. . .; znÞÞiky:wÞ ¼ d 2 DM : M
g
d
x
	 

wt
2Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
8
>
<
>
:
9
>
=
>
;
;
S12. if Q is a n-place predicate constant, (kx:u) is a modifier and Qikx:u is a n-place
modified predicate, then MgwtQikx:u z1; . . .; znð Þ iff g z1ð Þ; . . .; g znð Þh i 2 I w;th i
Qikx:u
 
;
the notions of satisfaction Pu (S13), Fu (S14) are defined in a standard way;
S15. if u is a formula, then Mgwtj½iu iff Mgwtiu;
the notions of satisfaction hu ðS16Þ; u ðS17Þ; 8xu ðS18Þ; 9xu ðS19Þ are defined in
a standard way;
S20.
if M
g
d
x
	 

wt
u for exactly one d 2 DM, then Igw;th i ix:uð Þ ¼ d; if it is not the
case that M
g
d
x
	 

wt
u for exactly one d 2 DM, then ix:u fails to designate
at w; th i in M with respect to g;
the notion of satisfaction of ðkx:uÞðsÞ (S21) is defined in a standard way;
S22. if a term s designates at w; th i in M with respect to g and ðkx:uÞiky:w is a
modified predicate abstract, then Mgwt kx:uð Þiky:w sð Þ iff Igw;th i sð Þ 2
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I
g
w;th iððkx:uÞiky:wÞ; if a term s fails to designate at w; th i in M with respect to g,
then Mgwt2 kx:uð Þiky:w sð Þ:
I will use symbol ‘!x:u’ for a special case of ix:u terms with only one variable x
which occurs free in u. There are no free variable occurrences in !x:u and due to this
if I
g
w;th i !x:uð Þ is defined then Igw;th i !x:uð Þ ¼ Ig
0
w;th i !x:uð Þ for any assignments g and g0.
That is why instead of ‘I
g
w;th i !x:uð Þ’ we will write ‘I w;th i !x:uð Þ’ which should be
understood as ‘I
g
w;th i !x:uð Þ’ where g is any assignment.
Now I will expand language L to Lþ by adding name-terms. I will skip all
syntactical and semantic definitions of Lþ duplicating the definitions of L and will
write below only new ones.
Definition IV The alphabet of Lþ.
A first-order language Lþ contains all symbols of L with the addition of an infinite
set of name-terms N ¼ n1; n2; n3; . . .f g.
Definition V The syntax of Lþ.
R1. the same as R1. of L;
R2. a name-term ni is a term with no free variable occurrences;
R3.–R12. are the same as R2.–R11. of L;
R13. ni is a modifier, where ni is a name-term;
R14.–R16. are the same as R12.–R14. of L;
R17. if (ðkx:Qðz1; . . .; znÞÞ is a predicate abstract and nj is a name-term, then
kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þinj is a predicate abstract modified by nj on ith
argument place of Q (where 1 i  n); the free variable occurrences
in kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þinj are those of ( kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ;
R18. if kx: Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ is a predicate abstract and nj is a name-term,
then kx: Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þinj is a predicate abstract modified by nj on ith
argument place of Q (where 1 i  n); the free variable occurrences
in kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þinj are those of kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þ;
R19.–R21. are the same as R16.–R18. of L;
R22. if kx:uð Þinj is a modified predicate abstract and nk is a name-term, then
kx:uð Þinj nkð Þ is a formula iff k ¼ j; the free variable occurrences in
kx:uð Þinj nkð Þ are those of kx:uð Þ;
R23. the same as R19. of L
Definition VI The semantics of Lþ
Let M ¼ hD; T ;\;W ; Ii be a model of L. A varying domain first-order model M
for Lþ is a structure M ¼ hD; T ;\;W ; I  i, where I  L ¼ I.
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Using already defined properties of M (Definition III) we define the following
sets, relations and functions.
S(a): set CL
Set CL is a set of iota-terms !x:½iu of L. ix:½iu 2 CL iff 1) there is a world
w 2 W such that for every time t 2 T !x:½iu designates at w; th i in M; 2)
u ¼ ðNiðxÞ ^ QðxÞÞ where Ni is a distinguished predicate and Q is a 1-place
undistinguished predicate. (I will use symbols ‘ci’, ‘cj’, for members of CL).
S(b): set D
D  CL 	W . ci;wh i 2 D iff for any time t 2 T I w;th i cið Þ is defined.
S(c): relation R
R  D2. ci;wh iR cj;w0
 
iff for any time t 2 T I w;th i cið Þ ¼ I w0;th i cj
 
and there is
the same predicate Nk in ci, cj.
Let D=R be a partition of set D by equivalence relation R and ci;wh i½ R be an
equivalence class from D=R.
S(d): function F
F : D=R! DM. For any ci;wh i½ R2 D=R; F ci;wh i½ R
  ¼ d, where for any time
t 2 T d ¼ I w;th i cj
 
for any ci;wh i 2 cj;w
  
R
.
Let  be any well-order relation on a set D=R and let hD=R; i be well-
ordered set.
S(e): function Q
Q : N ! D=R. Function Q for an argument ni gives an equivalence class
ci;wh i½ R in the following way:
• for n1 Q gives the least element of hD=R; i;
• for every next element of N (with respect to an index) Q gives next element
of hD=R; i;
• in case there are no next element in hD=R; i, then for a next element of N
Q gives the least element of hD=R; i.
S(f): relation S
S  D2: ci;wh iS cj;w0
 
iff ci;wh i; cj;w0
 
belong to the same equivalence class
ci;wh i½ R and w = w0.
S(g): function h
h : N 	W ! D=S. For any ni 2 N ;w 2 W h ni;wð Þ ¼ cj;w
  
S
 Q nið Þ
if there is such equivalence class, otherwise h ni; wð Þ is undefined.
Semantic rules S1.–S20. of language Lþ are the same as rules S1.–S20. of
language L (except of talking about I  instead of I);
S21. if ni is a name-term and CL 6¼ ;, then I w;th i nið Þ ¼ F Q nið Þ
 
; if CL ¼ ;, then
ni fails to designate in M
 (at any w0; t0h i);
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S22. if a term s designates at w; th i in M with respect to g, then
M gwt kx:uð Þ sð Þ iff M
 g d
x
	 

wt
u, where d ¼ I  g
w;th i sð Þ; if a term s fails
to designate at w; th i in M with respect to g, then M gwt2 kx:uð Þ sð Þ;
S23. if a term s designates at w; th i in M with respect to g and ð kx:uð Þiky:wÞ is a
modified predicate abstract, then M gwt kx:uð Þiky:w sð Þ iff I  gw;th i sð Þ 2 I  gw;th i
ððkx:uÞiky:wÞ; if a term s fails to designate at w; th i in M with respect to g,
then M gwt2 kx:uð Þiky:w sð Þ;
S24. if nk is a name-term and kx:uð Þink is a predicate abstract modified by nk, then
M gwtj kx:uð Þink nkð Þ iff there is a description !y:½jw 2 p1 h nk;wð Þð Þ, such
that M gwtj kx:uð Þiky:w nkð Þ.
Theorem I (taking a modifier ‘in and out’ of a predicate abstract) Let s be any
term, Q z1; . . .; znð Þ any atomic formula, ky:w any modifier, w; th i any evaluation
point, g any variable assignment and M any model. Then:
M gwt kx:Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
 
sð Þ iff M gwt kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w sð Þ.
Proof If s fails to designate in M at w; th i with respect to g, then (Def. VI.S22,
S23) both formulas are not satisfied in M at w; th i with respect to g. Let us assume
that s designates in M at w; th i with respect to g.
M gwt kx:Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
 
sð Þ iff (Def.VI.S22) M
 g d
x
	 

wt
Qiky:w z1; . . .;ð
znÞ, where d ¼ I  gw;th i sð Þ iff (Def.VI.S10) d 2 I  gw;th i kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w
 
. Because
d ¼ I  g
w;th i sð Þ, this is so iff (Def.VI.S23) M gwt kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w sð Þ. h
Theorem II (taking a modifier ‘in and out’ of a predicate abstracted from negated
atomic formula) Let s be any term, Q z1; . . .; znð Þ any negated atomic formula,
ky.w any modifier, w; th i any evaluation point, g any variable assignment and M
any model. Then:
M gwt kx:Qiky:w z1; . . .; znð Þ
 
sð Þ iff M gwt kx:Q z1; . . .; znð Þð Þiky:w sð Þ:
Proof Analogously as in Theorem I. h
Statement I (difference in negation scopes)
There is a model M , a point of evaluation w; th i, a variable assignment g, a name-
term n and a predicate constant Q such that
M gwt kx:Q z1; . . .; zmð Þð Þin nð Þ andM gwt2 kx:Q z1; . . .; zmð Þð Þin nð Þ:
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Proof Let M be a model of Lþ, W = {w}, for i = 1.
Let us use symbols ‘P’, ‘S’, ‘R’ instead ‘P1
0, ‘P20, ‘P30 of Lþ. Let IB be defined in
the following way:
Let I 
w;th i QQð Þ ¼ I w;th i Qð Þ for any predicate constant Q and any w; th i. For every
predicate not mentioned above and any w; th i function IB gives ;. According to
definitions (Def. VI.S(a)–S(c), S(f)), CL ¼ c1; c2; c3f g, D ¼ D=R ¼ D=S:
Let Lþ contain a name-term for any w; th i. Let us prove that
1ð ÞM gwt1 kx:P xð Þð Þn nð Þ and 2ð ÞM gwt12 kx:P xð Þð Þn nð Þ.
1ð ÞM gwt1 kx:P xð Þð Þn nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S24) there is a description
!y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that M gwt1 kx:P xð Þð Þky:w nð Þ iff (Theorem II)
there is a description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that M gwt1 kx:ð Pky:w xð ÞÞ
nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S22) there is a description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that
M
 g d
x
	 

wt1
Pky:w xð Þ, where d ¼ I w;t1h i nð Þ iff (Def. VI.S2) there is a
description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that M
 g d
x
	 

wt1
2Pky:w xð Þ, where d ¼
I 
w;t1h i nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S12) there is a description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that
d 62 I 
w;t1h i Pky:w
 
, where d ¼ I 
w;t1h i nð Þ.
. Let a description !y:½1w be description c3, !x:½1 R xð Þ ^ N1 xð Þð Þ.
. This means that (1) is true.
(2) M gwt1 kx:P xð Þð Þn nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S2)
M gwt12 kx:P xð Þð Þn nð Þ iff there is no a description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such
that M gwt1 kx:P xð Þð Þky:w nð Þ iff (Theorem II) there is no description
!y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that M gwt1 kx:Pky:w xð Þ
 
nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S22) there
is no description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such that M
 g d
x
	 

wt1
Pky:w xð Þ, where
2358 O. Poller
123
d ¼ I 
w;t1h i nð Þ iff (Def.VI.S12) there is no description !y:½1w 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, such
that d 2 I 
w;t1h i Pky:w
 
, where d ¼ I 
w;t1h i nð Þ.
, so (Def.VI.S9)
. This means that (Def.VI.S8) .
Description !x:½1 S xð Þ ^ N1 xð Þð Þ 2 p1 h n;wð Þð Þ, so (2) is false.
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